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ABSTRACT 
‘A Very Costly Industry’: the cost of Britain’s privatised railway  
This paper is concerned with the financial performance of the British passenger rail 
industry since privatisation in the mid-1990s.  This experiment, which not merely 
transferred a state-owned and fully integrated industry into the private sector, but 
dismantled it into over 100 separate entities, has generated considerable and highly 
critical academic literature.  A major contention of this literature is that, contrary to 
the predictions of its proponents, privatisation has largely failed to improve efficiency 
and has actually increased costs, or more exactly, costs are higher than they would 
have been, had privatisation not taken place.    
However, although various writers have put forward diverse arguments to support 
this position, robust data on the overall costs of the (now highly fragmented) industry 
have been lacking. Further, a proper assessment of the additional costs (or 
otherwise) of privatisation can only be made in light of ‘counterfactual’ estimates 
(necessarily speculative) of the costs of the state-run industry if privatisation had not 
occurred.   
This paper aims to fill this literature gap by: (1) constructing a robust series of the 
overall operating costs of British passenger rail services since privatisation, (2) 
projecting, using reasonable assumptions, what operating costs would have been if 
privatisation not taken place, and (3) estimating the increase in such costs arising 
since privatisation. 
The results, whilst they can only be broadly indicative, are nevertheless clear.  Even 
after conservative assumptions, rail privatisation has resulted in considerable 
additional costs: it was a major public policy error.   
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‘A Very Costly Industry’: the cost of Britain’s privatised railway  
 
‘There is a mystery, is there not? We look at the net figures and it is £5bn going into the 
railways this year and everybody tells us their part of the system is ever more efficient 
and effective, yet the bottom line is £5bn.’ 
Graham Stringer, MP, member of the House of Commons Transport Select Committee 
(TSC), 12 July 2006 (TSC, 2006, Q198). 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper is concerned with the financial performance of the British passenger rail 
industry since it was privatised in the mid-1990s.  This privatisation has generated a 
considerable academic literature, much of it highly critical.  Proponents of 
privatisation predicted it would lead to greater efficiency, more responsiveness to 
passenger needs, and the elimination of state subsidy and direction.  Many critics 
have argued that it has comprehensively failed to deliver, instead producing a 
structurally fragmented, operationally complex and financially dysfunctional 
industry.  For example, state financial support, forecast to disappear as premium 
payments made by franchisees on profitable lines outweighed subsidies elsewhere 
(Crompton and Jupe, 2003a, p. 399), has actually grown from £2.93bn in 1994/95 
to £5.28bn in 2013/14 (at 2013/14 prices – see ORR (2015a)).  And, some critics 
argue, the major beneficiaries of this largesse ‘are not the passengers but the 
owners of the rail companies and the providers of capital [so that] as in all previous 
sales of state-owned industries, rail privatisation has been used to transfer wealth 
from the public to the private sector’ (Jupe and Crompton, 2006, p. 1062).   
A major contention of the critical literature (reviewed below in Section 3) is that 
privatisation has failed to improve efficiency and has actually increased costs, or 
more exactly, costs are higher than they would have been, had privatisation not 
taken place.    
However, although various writers have put forward diverse arguments to support 
this position, robust data on the overall costs of the (now highly fragmented) 
industry have been lacking. Further, a proper assessment of the additional costs (or 
otherwise) of privatisation can only be made in light of detailed ‘counterfactual’ 
estimates (necessarily speculative) of the costs of the state-run industry if 
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privatisation had not taken place, which as far as the authors are aware, has not 
been attempted until now.   
This paper aims to shed light on this issue by:  
1 Deriving robust data, from publicly available sources, on the overall operating 
costs of British passenger rail services, both before and after privatisation, so that 
the way in which these costs have varied over time (and in relation to the volume of 
traffic) can be more clearly understood;  
2 Projecting, with reasonable assumptions, what these operating costs would 
have been had privatisation not taken place; and so 
3 Producing a reasonable estimate of the increase or decrease in such costs 
resulting from privatisation.   
The paper now proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a brief outline of the 
background to privatisation, the restructuring of the railways this involved, and the 
major actors in the post-privatisation industry; Section 3 provides a review of the 
literature, concentrating on that which has argued that railway privatisation has led 
to increased costs; Section 4 gives an analysis of the operating costs of privatised 
passenger services compared with the counterfactual outcome if the state-owned 
British Rail had been operating these services.  Finally, Section 5 provides some 
conclusions. 
2. The context 
2.1 A problematic privatisation 
The railways possess ‘several unique features’ which made privatisation particularly 
problematic. Although regarded as a ‘natural monopoly’ due to ‘the fixed costs of the 
network and the strength of the case for unified operation and vertical integration’, 
the railway industry was in a ‘competitive transport market’ and in decline, losing 
market share to road and air (Crompton and Jupe, 2003a, p. 398)   
In particular, the industry has very high fixed costs: about half of all operating costs 
relate to the infrastructure (track, signalling and stations) varying little with the 
volume of traffic. This is also true of utilities such as gas or electricity, but whereas 
the latter ‘provide an (almost) universal and essential service’ (Shaoul, 2004, p. 30) 
and so can ‘spread fixed costs across many users’, in contrast, rail passenger 
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services are ‘not universal and unavoidable’, and in the absence of adequate 
demand cannot fully recover these costs (Crompton and Jupe, ibid.). Full recovery 
from passengers would entail self-defeating fare increases that would ‘choke off 
demand’, inflict economic and social damage and be ‘politically unacceptable.’ 
Closure of subsidy-dependent lines would also have political and social 
consequences (Shaoul, 2002, p. 53).   
Thus, although the transfer of state-owned companies and utilities to the private 
sector was a defining feature of the 1979-97 Conservative administrations, there 
were initially grave reservations about privatising the railways.   
Margaret Thatcher (Prime Minister 1979-90) was particularly mindful of ‘the huge 
political risks’ and ‘nervous of the public reaction’ (Parker, 2012, p. 449). 
In the 1980s HM Treasury also showed a marked reluctance to embrace rail 
privatisation. The industry was regarded as a ‘large and complex system with many 
joint costs and interdependence of different services [which could not] be easily 
broken down into separate elements’.  Many lines could not be profitable, but would 
have to be subsidised for social reasons, rendering privatisation difficult if not 
infeasible (op. cit., pp. 445-6).  
When a commitment to privatise the railways was finally made by the Major 
government (in the Conservatives’ Election Manifesto in 1992) these problems were 
simply ignored. The subsequent White Paper, a slim document of 21 pages ‘rather 
lightweight’ on the economic rationale behind the privatisation plans (Preston, 1996, 
p. 2) blandly asserted that a privatised industry would ‘mean more competition, 
greater efficiency and a wider choice of services more closely tailored to what 
customers want’ and ‘provide greater opportunities to … reduce costs, without 
sacrificing quality’ (Department of Transport (DoT), 1992, pp. 1, 5). But evidence to 
support these assertions was distinctly lacking (Jupe and Crompton, 2006, p. 1037).   
Apart from a general predisposition to assume that ‘private’ must mean better, the 
government had a number of objectives in privatising the railways: to eliminate or at 
least reduce public subsidy; to raise money from the sale of assets (Crompton and 
Jupe, 2003a, p. 399); to transfer decision-making and risk to the private sector 
[Transport Select Committee (TSC), 2006, para. 25]; and, although this was never 
stated publicly, to weaken the position of the unions (Parker, 2012, p. 463) on the 
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assumption that it ‘would be easier to discipline the workforces of a fragmented 
industry’ (Cole and Cooper, 2006, p.609). 
However, once the decision in principle had been taken, the guiding idea or 
rationalisation was to introduce ‘as much competition as possible’ into the industry 
(Wolmar, 2005, p. 61; see also DoT, 1992, para. 25). This turned the exercise into 
the ‘most complex’ of the Thatcher/Major privatisations (Crompton and Jupe, 2003a, 
p. 398), involving the dismantling of a fully integrated state-owned corporation, 
British Rail, into more than 100 separate companies for sale to the private sector, an 
‘experiment in fragmenting a railway on a scale never contemplated anywhere else 
in the world before or since’ (Parker 2012, p. 495).   
 
2.2 The Privatisation Structure 
The key players in the new fragmented industry were: an infrastructure company, 
initially Railtrack, but later replaced by Network Rail (NR); train operating companies 
(TOCs) which were awarded franchises to operate passenger services in particular 
areas; rolling stock companies (ROSCOs) which supplied locomotives and carriages 
to the TOCs; and freight operators (FOCs) (see Gourvish, 2002). These entities 
contract with each other to operate their segment of the industry: thus a TOC leases 
rolling stock from a ROSCO and pays Track Access Charges (TACs) to Railtrack/NR 
to use the infrastructure. 
The complexity of the privatised industry led to a complex regulatory regime by three 
different agencies.  The Office of the Rail Regulator (ORR) fixed the level of TACs 
levied by the infrastructure company.  Another regulator, initially the Office of 
Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF), awarded franchises after competitive tenders 
and enforced consequent contracts.  When the Strategic Rail Authority was 
established1, it absorbed OPRAF: in 2005 management of franchises passed to the 
Department for Transport (DfT) as the Authority was wound up (SRA, 2006, p. 6).  
Finally, Her Majesty’s Railway Inspectorate, part of the Health and Safety Executive, 
had overall responsibility for issues of safety (Jupe and Crompton, 2006).   
 
                                            
1
 by the Transport Act 2000, primarily to provide strategic direction for the railway industry. 
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3. The Privatised Industry and its Costs 
3.1 Framing the discussion: British Rail versus the privatised industry 
A decade after privatisation, Gourvish (2008, p. 287) concluded that the 
government’s assumption that British Rail’s costs ‘were too high and could be 
reduced substantially by a private sector approach has proved to be erroneous’.  
Similarly the Official History of Privatisation (Parker, 2013, p. 319) notes that 
‘efficiency gains do not appear to have been extensive and costs have continued to 
rise. [Overall] results have been disappointing.’  
Passenger traffic has greatly increased since the mid-1990s as shown in Figure 1 
using several different metrics.  More trains are running on what is substantively the 
same network; the growth in passenger traffic is greater, and the growth in 
passenger revenue greater still.  Given the railways’ high fixed costs, this might have 
been expected to lead to a fall in unit costs (defined here as the cost of carrying one 
passenger one km) as it did when British Rail’s traffic increased in the 1980s (see 
Figure 5).  However, this does not appear to have happened. 
In his value-for-money study2, Sir Roy McNulty (2011, pp. 18-19) notes the increase 
in passenger traffic but also points out that ‘[s]ince 1996/97 passenger rail industry 
expenditure [had] increased by £4bn (pa) or 60% … only part [of which could] be 
directly attributed to the increase in outputs’.  
Lease charges for rolling stock had increased by £0.3bn pa reflecting ‘the increase in 
train-kms [per year] and the number of vehicles leased’; train operating costs had 
increased by £1.7bn, of which £0.8bn related to increased activity levels (train-kms).  
In addition, infrastructure costs soared in the aftermath of the Hatfield crash, peaking 
in 2003/4, but subsequent cost-cutting removed £1.1bn pa by 2010.  Reductions of 
‘between 1% and 3% per year in train operating costs and infrastructure operating 
and maintenance expenditure per passenger-km’ had been ‘largely offset [by] 
increases in renewals and enhancement expenditure’ (ibid.). However, the detailed 
                                            
2
 Commissioned by Lord Adonis, the Secretary of State for Transport in February 2010, to examine 
the ‘overall cost structure of all elements of the railway sector and to identify options for improving 
value for money to passengers’ (McNulty, 2011, p. 9).   
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basis of many of McNulty’s cost estimates and efficiency savings are not always fully 
supported or explained.  
Overall, unit costs showed ‘little or no improvement’ and actually increased on 
franchised services by 17% between 1996/97 and 2005/06, even ‘after allowing for 
changes in service frequency and train length’ (McNulty, 2011, pp. 29, 34).  Similarly, 
the TSC (2013, pp. 9, 36) concludes that ‘there has been no improvement from 
operating on a larger scale [since] train operating costs’ had increased by £1.7bn 
between 1996 and 2008 ‘in tandem’ with passenger traffic, while the Competition 
and Markets Authority (CMA, 2016, p. 60) highlights that ‘only part’ of the ‘significant 
increase in passenger rail expenditure’ since privatisation ‘can be directly attributed’ 
to increased traffic.  
In his ‘counterfactual paper’, Jupe (2011, pp. 337-8) suggests that British Rail would 
have managed the increased passenger traffic with greater efficiency than the 
privatised system has achieved.  Bowman et al. (2013, p. 135) argue that by the 
1980s its management was ‘delivering exemplary operating efficiency [compared 
with European counterparts] despite being starved of investment’. In 1994, 
government subsidy was 15% of passenger revenues (compared to 29% in 2013) 
making British Rail ‘the least subsidised railway system in Europe’ whilst labour 
productivity (train-kilometres per employee) was the highest (Shaoul, 2004, p. 29; 
ORR, 2013, p. 7).  State subsidy was 0.16% of GDP (against a European average of 
0.52%) and British Rail has been described as ‘perhaps the most financially 
successful railway in Europe’ (Crompton and Jupe, 2003b, p. 619; see also Harris 
and Godward, 1997, p. 52; Shires et al., 1997, p. 1).  It is plausible that British Rail 
would have further reduced its unit costs with the increase in traffic experienced in 
the last 20 years.   
 
3.2 Railway Industry: Competition and Franchising 
The purpose of separating infrastructure (track and stations) from the provision of 
passenger services, certainly on the part of the Treasury’s Privatisation Unit and Sir 
Christopher Foster (the Transport secretary’s special advisor), was to enable 
competition between train operators.  Indeed, the original idea was that TOCs would 
bid for the right to use particular train paths at particular times – analogous to the 
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way in which landing/take-off slots can be bid for at airports (Shaw, 2000, p. 23; 
Gourvish, 2002, p. 390; Pollitt and Smith, 2002, p. 467; Wolmar, 2005, pp. 52-53; 
Parker, 2012, pp. 453-5).   
A franchise system was embraced as the only means whereby competition, albeit 
periodic ‘competition for the market as opposed to competition in it’ could be 
sustained when the ‘open access’ model was abandoned as unworkable 
(Domberger and Jensen, 1997, p. 687).  Franchises were kept short, typically seven 
years, to allow ‘more frequent exposure to the market’ (DoT, 1993, para. 14), and 
passenger rolling stock was transferred to the ROSCOs and then leased to train 
operators, who thus need little capital commitment, reducing barriers to entry.   
3.3 The Train Operators 
However, over time competitive pressures on incumbent TOCs have attenuated.  
McCartney and Stittle (2011, p. 2) argue that the ‘cost and complexity of bidding for a 
franchise [constitute] significant barriers to entry’.  Indeed, the costs are so large 
(about £20m per franchise awarded3) that McNulty (2011, pp. 63, 67) even cites 
them as a significant saving from his proposed lengthening of franchise periods (to 
‘at least 15 years’). 
Moreover, ‘considerable emphasis [is] placed on past performance in the evaluation 
of bids, handicapping [new entrants]’ (McCartney and Stittle, ibid.).  The TSC (2006, 
para. 71) noted in 2006 that the franchise market had ‘attracted very few entrants in 
recent years’ and was an oligopoly: ‘three large transport groups either own or hold 
more than 48% of [the] shares’ in 14 franchise operators and ‘most companies 
bidding for franchises are now either transport groups that entered the market 
around the time of privatisation4 or overseas rail operators.’ By 2014, 74% of private 
rail contracts were held ‘by foreign [mainly French, German or Dutch] state 
owned/backed railways’ (RMT, 2014).  Taylor and Sloman (2012, p. 22) conclude 
that ‘fragmentation and franchising of train services has resulted in little real 
competition’.  
                                            
3
 About £3-£5m per bidder (typically three), plus £2-£5m start-up costs for the franchisee and £2.5m for the DfT (TSC, 2006, 
Para. 59; Ev. 69, para. 5.5).   
4
 Gourvish (2008, p. 276) describes the retendering process as resembling ‘the shuffling of a pack of cards’.   
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On the other hand Alastair Morton, Chair of the Shadow Strategic Rail Authority5, 
argued as early as 1999 for 10-to-20 year franchises to give TOCs sufficient 
incentive to make long-term investments (Poole and Dyer, 1999, p. 16); similarly the 
TSC (2006, para. 90; 2009, paras. 18-19) has urged franchise periods of up to 15 
years, with pre-defined break points at which the franchise could be withdrawn if 
specified targets had not been met. McNulty (2011, p. 63) argues that longer 
franchises would give TOCs more incentive ‘to innovate on services, make long-term 
investment [and] address difficult industrial relations challenges’.   
These arguments have some force, but only if one forgets that short franchises were 
instituted precisely to ensure competition, the alpha of the industrial restructuring at 
privatisation.  An oligopolistic train operator who is awarded a 25-year franchise, 
terminable early only if it fails to meet contractually-specified conditions, might be 
under regulatory pressure, depending on how aggressively the contract is policed, 
but is not facing any competitive pressure.   
Since March 2013 there has been a ‘proliferation of Direct Awards’, where franchises 
have been extended without a competitive process: six such awards had been made 
by October 2014 (Butcher, 2015, p. 6) and a further four in the following year. The 
National Audit Office (NAO, 2015, paras 3, 10) argues that Direct Awards are 'a 
sensible temporary measure [and the DfT] has contained risks to value for money 
from these non-competed contracts by limiting the number and duration, with most 
lasting between two and three years.' Yet the Treasury had originally wanted 
tendered franchises as short as three years to maximise competitive pressure, a 
plan only abandoned when it proved unacceptable to investors (see Jupe and 
Crompton, 2006, p. 1043; Parker, 2012, p. 471).   
Other flaws in the structuring of the privatised industry as they affect the TOCs have 
been identified by researchers.  Lease charges to the ROSCOs and TACs, which are 
both largely fixed, constitute most of their operating costs: the proportion they can 
actually control is as low as 6-11% so they have ‘little incentive to run a more 
                                            
5
 The Shadow SRA was set up in 1999 prior to the Transport Act 2000 which officially created it (Gourvish, 2008, p. 42).   
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efficient railway’ (Taylor and Sloman, pp. 23, 59) and actually focus on revenue6 
(McNulty, 2011, p. 59).   
Preston (1996, pp. 9-10) argues that the optimal railway network (i.e. which 
minimised operating costs) would be about 4,000km, running 120m train-km pa, 
implying that British Rail should have been broken up into no more than ‘three or four 
network operators’ which was ‘the configuration of the industry prior to 
nationalization in 1947 and, in a different format [the way British Rail itself] was 
evolving through sectorization’ in its final years.  Inviting tenders for 25 passenger 
franchises7 kept down the size and cost of individual franchises, encouraged 
tenderers to come forward, and helped make the privatisation a success, but pushed 
up overall costs (Crompton and Jupe, 2003b, p. 623; Jupe and Crompton, 2006, pp. 
1040-2).   
Furthermore, there is no effective transfer of risk from state to private sector, as 
there is ‘little penalty associated with abandoning a franchise’ (Taylor and Sloman, 
2012, p. 38) and as Li and Stittle, (2014, p. 62) argue, the 
unique nature of the railway industry mean[s] that the state [is] never free of its ultimate 
responsibilities … TOCs are aware from experience that the Government (in order to 
avoid playing its role as the ‘operator of last resort’) will spend considerable time and 
effort, and even provide additional support, if a franchise runs into difficulty. 
Indeed, TOCs were guaranteed additional support should actual passenger 
revenues fall below the levels specified in their franchise tender documents8 (ibid., 
pp. 47, 94).   
TOCs are special purpose vehicles, wholly-owned subsidiaries of the successful 
tenderer, created to operate a given franchise, which can be closed down without 
wider financial consequences.  Franchisees are required to post performance bonds, 
forfeit if the contract is broken, but these are relatively small, and no deterrent to 
abandonment, especially if the TOC has committed to make substantial premium 
payments.  Indeed, Bowman et al. (2013, p. 14) argue that the bidding process 
encourages ‘predatory contractualism’ where tenderers ‘game the system with 
                                            
6
 Strangely, McNulty also notes that that the ‘efficiency of the best performing [TOCs is] typically some 30% better than [that of] 
poorer performing companies’ as if there were room for large efficiency gains by the latter.  These differences must be due to 
the ‘structural factors’ mentioned earlier, such as the use of management (‘cost plus’) contracts in some franchises and the 
years ‘remaining on a franchise’ (op. cit., pp. 34-35). 
7
 Initially, it was planned to have more, ‘reflecting pressure from those who wanted to create a competitive railway’, but 
investors required larger franchises (Parker, 2012, p.468).   
8
 Bowman et al. (2013, pp. 93-4)  note that in 2011/12, ‘cap and collar’ revenue support was claimed by 8 out of the 18 
franchises, describing this as ‘extraordinarily generous’.  However, since 2012, the ‘collar’ support mechanism has been 
primarily related to exogenous factors such as changes in GDP.  
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optimistic projections of passenger numbers and back loaded premium payments ... 
take easy profits in the early years and then walk away to avoid large premium 
payments’.  
McCartney and Stittle (2011) offer a case study of this. Sea Containers won the East 
Coast Main Line franchise in 2005, undertaking to make premium payments (on a 
rising trend) of £1.9bn over ten years.  Yet the TOC’s balance sheet showed net 
assets of only £5.5m (GNER, 2006), and when it began to make losses, due to 
shortfalls in revenue, it surrendered the franchise in December 2006 and 
subsequently went into liquidation, with only a trivial impact on its parent 
undertaking.  
The franchise was retendered, and awarded to National Express (August 2007), only 
for them to withdraw in July 2009 after incurring heavy losses. The then Minister of 
Transport, Lord Adonis riposted that it was ‘unacceptable to reap the benefits of 
contracts when times are good, only to walk away from them when times become 
more challenging’ but insisted this did not demonstrate any flaw in the franchising 
system, and six months later (in January 2010) declared that ‘[a]s a system, 
franchising is largely delivering well for both passengers and taxpayers’ (McCartney 
and Stittle, 2011, p. 6; DfT, 2010, p. 5).  But even he clearly felt something was 
amiss somewhere in the industry, since he commissioned Sir Roy McNulty’s value-
for-money study just a few weeks later.  McNulty (2011, p. 34) noted, inter alia, that 
‘unit costs … of franchised services in Great Britain (after allowing for changes in 
service frequency and train length) increased by 17.1% between 1996/97 and 
2005/06’ and that TOCs’ efficiency was poor compared with franchised services in 
European counterparts.  
The above discussion concerns only franchisee TOCs.  The ORR can authorise 
‘access to the network on certain routes for a specified time’ by Open Access 
Operators, who compete with the franchise operators but ‘pay lower track charges’ 
based on marginal costs. The CMA has argued that more widespread use of Open 
Access Operators could provide ‘a greater degree of competition ‘in’ the market 
[leading] to a reduction in costs’ (2016, pp. 13, 20).  However, historically, such 
operators have accounted for only a trivial proportion of passenger-mileage: just 
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0.7% in 2013/14 (ORR, 2015c) and so have been ignored for the purposes of this 
paper.   
3.4 The ROSCOs 
The rationale for vesting British Rail’s passenger rolling stock with the ROSCOs was 
that the useful life of these assets (up to 40 years) was far longer than the franchises 
being tendered and, absent a functioning second-hand market, TOCs would be 
unwilling to invest in new rolling stock when they had no guarantee that franchises 
would be renewed.  Three ROSCOs were established to create a competitive 
industry, and in theory, TOCs could purchase rolling stock or lease it elsewhere.  
Thus the ROSCOs were left unregulated and ‘subject only to general competition 
law’ (ORR, 1998a, Forward), despite being indirect beneficiaries of public subsidies 
via the TOCs. In practice, the ROSCOs, whose very existence is due to the way the 
railways were privatised, have been able to ‘deliver exceptional returns to their 
investors, particularly so in the first few years after privatisation’9 despite their very 
low level of risk’ (McCartney and Stittle, 2012, pp. 155, 165).  Rolling stock is ‘highly 
non-substitutable’ between franchises and there is virtually no surplus available.  The 
TOCs have little leverage over the ROSCOs on charges, and generally treat them as 
a ‘pass through’ cost to the DfT (McNulty, 2011, pp. 235-6).   
The government has now tacitly conceded that the rolling stock market is not 
functioning as originally intended i.e. a ‘fully competitive market for the provision of 
new and second-hand rolling stock [with] no public sector intervention’ (DoT, 1993, 
paras. 4, 19), and has become actively involved in procuring rolling stock e.g. for the 
next generation of Intercity10 and Thameslink trains.  Here the government has taken 
‘the lead’ because of ‘structural issues and the scale of the procurements’ (NAO, 
2014, p. 6), and assumed ‘all the risk’ of a £10.5bn contract: if passenger demand 
forecasts prove incorrect ‘taxpayers would have to cover the costs of any financial 
shortfall’ (op. cit., pp. 3-4). 
3.5 Infrastructure holder 
                                            
9
 In 1997-99 the operating profits of the ROSCOs were equivalent to about 15% of overall passenger revenue (McCartney and 
Stittle, 2012, p. 162; ORR, 2006, p. 17).   
10
 InterCity trains are express services, predominantly from London to major UK cities; Thameslink trains are suburban services 
through London.   
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The railway infrastructure of track, signalling and stations, the vast bulk of British 
Rail’s assets, were transferred on 1 April 1994 to a separate company, Railtrack, 
which was floated on the stock exchange two years later.  It was set up, following 
recommendations from the consultants McKinsey, as an ‘engineering-free 
corporation’ (Gourvish, 2002, p. 402), which would buy in any necessary skills and 
expertise11.  In fact it became, as the Rail Regulator himself put it, ‘a less than 
competent client of its infrastructure contractors’ (TSC, 2004b, Q.186), which was 
‘excessively dependent on consultants, on whom it spent at least £225 million in 
2001/02’ (Crompton and Jupe, 2007, p. 910).  This was a striking contrast to the ‘Big 
Four’ railway companies in the inter-war years, whose engineers were the ‘dominant 
management grouping’ not the accountants as in much of British industry 
(Lawrenson, 1992, p. 46).   
The directors of the newly-floated Railtrack ‘did not did not hide the fact that its 
priorities were not those of the nationalised railway’.  They aimed to generate returns 
to shareholders, who received generous dividends (£709 million between 1995/96 
and 2000/01), and a rising share price (from 390p at flotation to a peak of 1768p).  
The directors ‘incentivised’ themselves with a profit-linked bonus scheme and share 
options worth £1.8m at the peak share price (McCartney and Stittle, 2015, pp. 115-6; 
see also Wolmar, 2005, pp. 92-5).  In practice the actual focus of the Railtrack’s 
management was not on maintaining the infrastructure or controlling costs, but on 
extracting concessions from the Rail Regulator.  Here Railtrack was spectacularly 
successful: e.g. the 40% increase in revenue from the ‘breathtakingly generous’ 
settlement for the control period12 2001-6 (Crompton and Jupe, 2003c, p. 15).  But 
costs ballooned: Railtrack’s investment projects, according to some experts, cost 
double or treble the amount British Rail would have paid; consultants commissioned 
by the ORR concluded that Railtrack had ‘no effective incentive to enhance and 
develop the network in an entrepreneurial manner’.  It was spending more on the 
infrastructure than British Rail but presiding over ‘a decline in the underlying quality 
of the network’ (Crompton and Jupe, 2003a, p. 413).  After Railtrack collapsed into 
administration in 2001, the Rail Regulator accused the company of having ‘had ... 
                                            
11
 Gourvish (2002, p. 440) acidly comments that there was ‘more than a grain of truth’ in the caricature of Railtrack operating 
like an absentee landlord ‘who collects rents but undertakes no property services directly [merely employing] outside 
contractors … to undertake emergency repairs when tenants complain.’  
12
 Control periods are five year funding and budgeting time periods.  
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almost a policy, certainly latterly, of neglecting their assets’ (Shaoul, 2004, p. 34; see 
also Crompton and Jupe, 2007, p. 911; TSC, 2002, Q799).   
The government then sponsored a new entity which took over the railway 
infrastructure in October 2002.  NR is a company limited by guarantee: with no 
equity it is funded entirely by debt.  This was highly controversial: it was widely 
asserted in the press and by the political opposition that NR was only set up as a 
technically private company so its debt could be excluded from government (Public 
Sector Net Debt) borrowing figures (McCartney and Stittle, 2006). 
However, some have argued that the way NR is structured has had malign effects – 
and driven up costs.  NR was unable to borrow without government support.  The 
government was unwilling to give a formal guarantee, but let it be understood that 
the Strategic Rail Authority would make a £7bn contingency fund available if 
necessary: much significance was invested in the distinction between ‘guarantee’ 
and ‘underwrite’.  The result was that NR has had to pay a premium over 
government borrowing rates, incurring substantial additional costs13.  
NR’s funding regime whereby the Rail Regulator fixes TACs for quinquennial periods 
means that NR’s incentive is merely to hold costs below the regulatory settlement’s 
limit, with ‘little pressure to work out the most cost-effective solution on particular 
projects’ (Crompton and Jupe, 2007, p. 922). 
NR’s members meet infrequently and cannot control the directors: indeed, a majority 
are appointed by the directors while others (e.g. TOCs) have special interests to 
pursue (Crompton and Jupe, 2007, p. 918; McCartney and Stittle, 2006, pp. 144-45).  
The TSC (2004a) concluded that the members were not ‘exercising an effective 
control of the company’ and that the ‘ownership structure is unacceptably weak’ (op. 
cit., para. 59; Summary).   
McNulty (2011, pp. 59-60) argues that without the need to generate a return for 
shareholders NR has ‘weak incentives to tackle unit costs [and] only limited 
incentives to outperform regulatory targets and to minimise costs’. In contrast, the 
TOCs are fully compensated (under their franchise terms) for any increase in TACs, 
and so have no incentive to bargain with NR, which places insufficient priority on 
                                            
13
 Crompton and Jupe (2007, pp. 913, 920) estimate these at £30m in 2004/05 (2007, pp. 913, 920) while Lawlor (2011, p. 33) 
suggests £150m in 2009.  
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cost and tends to over-specify (‘gold-plating’)14.  He also (op. cit., p. 32) highlights ‘an 
efficiency gap between NR and the top-performing European railways of between 34 
and 40%’.  The House of Commons Public Accounts Committee (PAC) has made 
similar criticisms and argued that ‘private sector lenders [could not] provide the 
necessary discipline on the company to offset the extra cost of finance’ (Jupe, 2012, 
p. 181; 2006, p. 150; PAC, 2005, p. 5).  However, neither McNulty nor the PAC 
explain, or even ask, why Railtrack, driven precisely by the need to generate 
shareholder returns, proved such a failure.   
Railtrack’s collapse had been triggered by a serious accident at Hatfield in October 
2000 which revealed the poor state of the infrastructure, and expenditure increased 
dramatically as NR rectified its predecessor’s neglect.  This peaked in 2003/4, but 
was then brought down and by 2011 had fallen to the same level as 1996/97.  
McNulty attributes this to the removal of ‘a large part of post Hatfield cost increase’ 
and NR largely achieving its target of a 30% cost reduction in Control Period 3 
(2004-2009).  He also draws attention to a sizeable reduction in renewals unit costs 
by 29% from its post-Hatfield peak, while conceding that ‘efficiency improvements in 
track, in particular, have been difficult to achieve’ (2011, p. 19).  The ORR (2015b, 
pp. 3-4, 24) has also noted problems: NR missed ‘30 out of its 84 planned 
milestones in its Enhancements Delivery Plan’ in 2014-15 and ‘overspent its budget 
by around £230m’.  Work on renewals was behind schedule and had ‘cost 19% more 
than expected’.  Overall, although NR ‘is largely delivering on the plan's milestones, 
these are not improving train performance as much as predicted’ (see also ORR, 
2013).   
3.6 Industry Fragmentation 
A number of writers have argued that the key flaw in the privatisation of the railways 
was the fragmentation of a hitherto integrated industry.  In 2006, even Chris 
Grayling, then Conservative Shadow Transport Secretary, repudiated the original 
privatisation model, acknowledging that the ‘separation of track and train into 
separate businesses … has helped push up the cost of running the railways’ (Jupe, 
2011, p. 338).   
                                            
14
 Malcolm Rifkind, McGregor’s predecessor as Transport Secretary had rejected a separate track authority on the grounds that 
it would ‘invest to maximise the quality of the rail infrastructure and simply pass on the costs either to train users or the 
taxpayer’ (Parker, 2012, p. 451).   
18 
 
Harris and Godward (1997, p. 107-10) argue that fragmentation has two deleterious 
effects.  First, ‘interface costs’ arise due to the more complex supply chain e.g. 
rolling stock is supplied by a manufacturer to a ROSCO, which leases it to a TOC. 
Each actor requires a profit, driving up the overall cost. Second, there are ‘cash 
leakages’ as interest payments and dividends are extracted from the industry 
(Crompton and Jupe, 2003a, pp. 399-400; see also Crompton and Jupe, 2003b, pp. 
628-30; Shaoul, 2004, p. 32; 2006, p. 157; Jupe and Crompton, 2006, p. 1052; 
Taylor and Sloman, 2012, pp. 17-21; Jupe and Funnell, 2015, p. 13).  
The TSC’s (1995, p. 172) forecast that these factors would add £715m pa to the 
industry’s costs was rejected by the Department of Transport, but turned out to be ‘a 
major underestimate in the light of the actual impact of privatisation’ (Crompton and 
Jupe, 2003b, p. 630).  Thus British Rail’s interest charges were, in theory, available 
for re-investment in the industry (Shaoul, 2006, p. 157) and, in 1993/94, were only 
£121m; by 2000/01 dividend payments (mainly by the TOCs, ROSCOs and 
Railtrack) and interest charges (mostly by Railtrack) were £986m, and all extracted 
from the industry.  Between 1995/1996 and 2002/2003 these ‘leakages’ amounted to 
£5.45bn, just over half the £10.7bn subsidy paid to TOCs in that period (Jupe and 
Crompton, 2006, pp. 1055-6).   
After the collapse of Railtrack, Shaoul (2006, p. 157) saw the largest cash leakages 
coming from the ROSCOs; Taylor and Sloman, (2012) on the contrary, estimate that 
in 2009, dividends from TOCs (£227m) were larger than those of the ROSCOs 
(£207m); Jupe (2009, pp. 191, 200; see also Jupe, 2011) notes that interest on NR’s 
ever-larger borrowings more than doubled from £361m in 2002/03 to £822m in 
2006/07 and by 2009 exceeded £1bn.   
Crompton and Jupe (2003a) point out that the TACs and lease charges paid by train 
operators (and introduced by privatisation) ‘represent over 90% of the revenue of 
Railtrack and the ROSCOs, respectively’ and argue that that ‘interface costs added 
at least £3 billion per year’ to rail industry costs’ (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 Key Costs (£m), nominal terms, (1996-2001) 
Key Costs 1996/7 1997/8 1998/9 1999/2000 2000/1 
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TACS 2,165 2,149 2,169 2,175 2,089 
Leasing 
charges 
   821    797     747    864    804 
Total 2,986 2,946 2,916 3,039 2,893 
Source: Crompton and Jupe (2003a, Table 1, p. 400).   
 
These charges did not exist before privatisation since British Rail owned and 
maintained the infrastructure and built its own rolling stock, incurring substantial 
costs, even if significantly less than the above interface charges, which therefore 
cannot be treated simply as additional costs imposed by privatisation.   
Shaoul (2006, p. 157), defining interface costs ‘conservatively’ as ‘5% of payments to 
the industry’s suppliers at each level in the supply chain’, plus leakages (interest and 
post-tax profit of the infrastructure holder, ROSCOs and train operators) produced an 
estimate of £800m pa. However, this would explain only a fraction of the increase in 
industry costs from £3.6bn in 1993/94 to a ‘staggering’ £7.4bn in 2003, an increase 
largely funded by the public through fares and taxes (op. cit., p. 157). 
Taylor and Sloman (op. cit., p. 7) estimate ‘fragmentation costs’ at £581m in 2009, 
made up of interface costs between the TOCs and NR (£290m), costs of NR 
outsourcing (£200m) and operating margins of TOC and ROSCO sub-contractors 
(£91m).  Overall, their ‘minimum’ estimate of the additional cost of the privatised 
railway, including only costs that can be ‘most readily quantified’ is about £1.2bn pa, 
and cumulatively some £11bn up to 2010.  Jupe and Funnell (2015, p. 14) estimate 
that ‘infrastructure costs have tripled since privatisation, with the key driver being 
substantial interface costs.’ 
McNulty (2011) focused on achieving economies within the existing industry 
structure and did not make comparisons with British Rail.  Nevertheless, the 
fragmentation of the industry has created barriers to the whole system approach 
favoured by his study (although the obvious whole system approach – 
renationalisation – is curtly dismissed) and he repeatedly points to the fragmented 
structure as a cause of increased costs e.g. highlighting that 
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industry relationships are based on contracts, for example between … train operators 
and [Network Rail] rather than partnerships [which] can lead to inflexibility and 
confrontation [and] slow and ineffective decision-making (2011, p. 49, 84, 284-6; see 
also Atkins Consultancy (2011) which is cited in support).   
Ironically, replacing the integrated command structure of British Rail with ‘contractual 
relationships between free-standing autonomous bodies’ which would allow 
competition was precisely the economic rationale for the structure created by 
privatisation, as expounded by its ‘chief architect’, Sir Christopher Foster (2003, p. 6; 
see also Preston, 1999, p. 9).   
Foster argues that ‘modern management methods, accounting systems and 
computers’ have nullified the advantages an integrated industry might have enjoyed 
in the past.  But although he cites works by Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson, he 
implies that the costs of fragmentation are largely administrative (e.g. sharing the 
revenue from through ticketing), which, if that is what he means, is a rather simplistic 
interpretation of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE).  This argues that the arranging 
(and enforcing) of contracts between the autonomous actors in a free market 
imposes transaction costs: if these are burdensome then non-market co-ordination of 
some kind (e.g. vertical integration) may be more efficient.  And more important than 
administrative or bureaucratic costs are the ‘hazards of contracting’ (Williamson, 
2005, p. 8).  Contractors behave in a self-interested, opportunist fashion, imposing 
costs on counterparties, while complex contracts are inevitably incomplete and 
require renegotiation, incurring further costs.  Hazards are particularly severe when a 
party makes contract-specific investments whose value cannot be fully recovered 
outside it (e.g. in bespoke equipment), and demands compensation for the risk thus 
undertaken, driving up overall costs.   
McCartney and Stittle (2012) use TCE in their analysis of the ROSCOs, and it has 
been argued that it is key to understanding what has ‘gone wrong’: Tyrrall (2003, p. 
38) even describes rail privatisation as a ‘failed experiment in transaction cost 
economics.’  
Similarly, Li and Stittle (2014, p. 55), who use Agency Theory, argue that franchises 
can be viewed as ‘incomplete contracts [which] can also leave room for potential ex 
post opportunism and underinvestment [by TOCs] which are exacerbated in such a 
fragmented industry.’  Cole and Cooper (2006) emphasise the lack of control 
consequent upon the fragmentation of the industry, and the loss of ‘skills and tacit 
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knowledge’ as new entrants replaced British Rail’s employees.  Their primary 
concern is the impact of privatisation on safety, but their analysis obviously has a 
wider significance.  
For proponents of privatisation, pointing to structural flaws has even become a 
means of explaining away its failures.  David Howell, a Conservative Transport 
Secretary in the early 1980s, later blamed the Treasury for its ‘insistence on pushing 
through a half-baked model of railway privatisation’ (Parker, 2012, p. 499). A leading 
figure at the Institute of Economic Affairs15 (and an academic) has argued that rail 
privatisation was: 
two experiments. The first was with private ownership … The second was the imposition 
of a particular vertically disintegrated structure … that could not easily be changed and 
that had never emerged before as an outcome of market processes (Booth, 2006, p. 15). 
Academics such as Newbery (2006) and Parker (2006), firm supporters of 
privatisation in general, also criticise the resulting restructuring of the railways, with 
Parker (op. cit., p. 384) arguing that ‘[f]ew now defend the form of this privatisation 
and its resulting transaction costs.’ 
As Parker (2013) points out, many of the foregoing problems were clearly anticipated 
by ministers and civil servants while privatisation was still under discussion. 
Thus John McGregor, the transport secretary in 1992-94, admitted that privatisation 
was ‘likely to impose additional costs on the Exchequer at least in the short-term’; 
similarly, the British Rail Board continued ‘to harbour severe reservations about the 
precise form privatization was taking, believing that the fragmented railway would be 
…less effective and efficient’. Parker (op. cit. pp. 317-9) concludes that ‘[r]ail 
privatization in Britain was the product of hubris about the benefits of competition.’   
Thus government ministers were not as sanguine about the beneficent impact of 
privatisation as they claimed, which may explain why they went to such lengths to 
manipulate the outcome of the privatisation to ensure its apparent success.  Inter 
alia, Railtrack was given a present of £707m of British Rail’s tax losses (worth about 
£230m at prevailing tax rates); responsibility for the upkeep of about 1,000 bridges (a 
liability with a present value of about £1bn) was quietly transferred  to local 
authorities; and £1bn of British Rail’s debt (to the government) was simply written off 
                                            
15
 A prominent right-wing ‘think-tank’.   
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(see Harris & Godward, 1997, p. 132; Shaoul, 2004, p. 31; Crompton and Jupe, 
2003, pp. 626-7; Parker, 2012, p. 487).   
 
4. Analysis of cost data 
4.1 The approach in this study 
Generally, previous estimates of the additional costs of the privatised railway 
industry have been limited both in extent and depth. 
Thus Crompton and Jupe have emphasised the additional costs of the TACs and the 
ROSCOs’ leasing charges, while Shaoul has pointed to the additional costs arising 
from the fragmented industries’ interfaces and relates costs to the industry’s revenue 
levels.  Taylor and Sloman have made a (very conservative) estimate of the 
additional costs without providing a detailed breakdown.  McNulty has examined 
ways of reducing industry costs within the basic structure established by 
privatisation: longitudinal cost comparisons in the McNulty Report do not include the 
pre-privatisation period nor does it explicitly examine the extent to which additional 
costs have been caused by privatisation. 
This study aims to analyse exactly this area, by producing estimates of overall 
annual operating costs for the (passenger-carrying) railway industry on a comparable 
basis from 1980/81 to 2013/14, using data from publicly available financial 
statements.  For this purpose ‘operating costs’ is taken to mean all costs other than 
finance charges.  British Rail’s accounts were prepared under a ‘Direction’ from the 
Secretary of State for Transport, which in the 1980s/90s required accounts as if it 
were a private company, in line with accounting standards and giving a ‘true and fair 
view’ (British Rail, various years; McCartney and Stittle, 2015).  The private limited 
companies that succeeded it all prepared accounts under UK GAAP before adopting 
International Standards in 2005 – but this change had only a minimal impact on the 
figures for operating costs.  There is thus a high degree of consistency in the 
definition of ‘operating costs’ throughout the period being examined here.   
 
4.2 The data sets utilised 
The Nationalised Industry – to 1993/94 
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Operating costs of British Rail’s rail activities from 1980/81 to 1993/94 are shown in 
Figure 2, extracted from its accounts, which permit a breakdown into Passenger 
Traffic and other sectors.  
The Interregnum - 1994/95 to 1996/97 
The process of privatisation was prolonged: the necessary restructuring of British 
Rail began in 1994/95 and the last franchise was awarded from February 1997 
(Curwen, 1997, p. 56).  Reliable cost information for this period proved very difficult 
to find due to the industry restructuring, so no cost figures have been estimated.   
The Privatised Industry – from 1997/98 
Aggregate annual financial information for the railway industry is available, but only 
from 2010/2011 (ORR, 2012).  In principle, it should be sufficient to aggregate the 
operating costs of the TOCs from their published accounts, inasmuch as each TOC 
is a special purpose vehicle created to operate a given franchise by the successful 
tenderer, and the costs of other actors will pass through them16.  Initially, there were 
25 TOCs, one per franchise, albeit these were owned by only 13 different tenderers 
(Curwen, 1997, p. 56), but after some consolidation as the DfT reconfigured the 
franchise map, the number had been reduced to 19 by 2013/14, with just 11 
operators in various permutations (DfT, 2015). 
The ORR receives monthly management accounts from each TOC, but this 
information is ‘exempt from disclosure under s.44’ of the Freedom of Information Act 
since the ORR is prohibited (under s.145 of the Railways Act, 1993) from publishing 
‘information about a business … that has been obtained in the exercise of (its) 
functions as an economic regulator.’17. 
This study has therefore extracted information from the publicly available financial 
statements of franchisee TOCs.  The DfT (or earlier the Strategic Rail Authority) has 
directly operated passenger services, where a franchise was revoked due to poor 
performance (e.g. Connex South East in 2003) or abandoned by the franchise-holder 
(e.g. the earlier-mentioned East Coast Main Line), but in these cases the operators 
were companies wholly-owned by the DfT and have been treated like other TOCs.   
                                            
16
 A parent company may bear some costs e.g. directors’ remuneration, but has no incentive to reduce the TOC’s operating 
costs.   
17
 In response to the authors’ FOI request: FOI/13-14/153 on 28 November 2013.   
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At first sight it would appear to be sufficient to aggregate the operating costs of the 
TOCs for the period of their franchises, but there are two complicating factors: 
1 Government subsidies to the infrastructure holder (currently NR) mean that 
the latter may not recover all its costs through TACs.  Indirectly subsidising 
passenger traffic in this way enables franchises to appear more profitable than they 
really are, and the privatised system a ‘success’ (Bowman, 2015).  Such 
unrecharged operating costs of passenger rail services need to be added to the 
costs appearing in the TOCs’ own accounts, but  
2 The accounts of Railtrack/NR, unlike those of British Rail, do not clearly 
indicate a breakdown of costs between passenger and freight traffic. Whilst the 
former accounts for the majority of railway revenue and costs, the latter is still 
significant in absolute terms, and is supported by relatively heavy government 
subsidies, mostly paid to the infrastructure holder (McCartney and Stittle, 2013). 
So to permit a tolerably accurate estimate of passenger operating costs, a 
computation has been made of overall industry costs (both passenger and freight) 
and an estimate of freight costs deducted from it.  
This computation can be represented as: 
IND = PASS  +  FR  +  INFR  -  TACP  -  TACF 
Where: 
IND = Industry operating costs 
PASS = Operating costs of Passenger TOCs 
FR = Operating costs of Freight Operating Companies (FOCs)18 
INFR = Operating costs of infrastructure holder (Railtrack/NR) 
TACP =  TACs paid by TOCs 
TACF = TACs paid by FOCs 
 
These costs have been extracted from the published financial statements of the 
entities concerned, and involved examination of nearly 600 sets of financial 
statements filed at Companies House.   
Freight operating costs 
                                            
18
 The DfT does not insist that FOCs be dedicated vehicles, but the scale of their other activities is relatively small, so including 
their overall costs does significantly distort the results.   
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As explained, the operating costs of the privatised freight industry cannot be directly 
computed from published financial information.  Instead, real unit costs have been 
calculated from British Rail’s financial statements (see Figure 3) and a conservative 
estimate of £0.10 per tonne/km (at 2013/14 prices) based thereon has been applied 
to post-privatisation freight volumes.  In other words, the privatised freight industry is 
assumed to make zero efficiency gains between 1994/95 and 2013/14.  This may 
overestimate freight industry costs – and so lead to an underestimate of passenger 
costs. 
The resulting overall passenger traffic costs are shown in Table 2 and Figure 4, 
along with the volume of traffic (in passenger-kms). 
 
Table 2: Operating costs of the privatised industry, 1997/98 to 2013/14 
 Col 1 Col 2 Col 3 Col 4 Col 5 Col 6 Col 7 Col 8 Col 9 Col 10 
 Operating costs at nominal prices        Op costs at 13/14 prices  Traffic 
Year TOCs FOCs RT/NR TACs FACs Industry Industry Freight Pass'gs Pass/kms 
£m £m £m £m £m £m £m £m £m (bns) 
1997/98 4,898 686 2,083 (2,149) (164) 5,354 8,487 (1,690) 6,797 34.7 
1998/99 4,940 670 2,097 (2,169) (169) 5,369 8,254 (1,734) 6,520 36.3 
1999/00 4,941 748 2,179 (2,175) (158) 5,535 8,376 (1,823) 6,553 38.5 
2000/01 5,027 750 2,344 (2,089) (162) 5,871 8,627 (1,809) 6,818 38.2 
2001/02 5,305 766 3,990 (1,633) (86) 8,342 12,077 (1,939) 10,138 39.1 
2002/03 5,615 810 2,885 (800) (35) 8,475 12,018 (1,852) 10,166 39.7 
2003/04 6,187 937 3,364 (1,899) (68) 8,521 11,756 (1,887) 9,869 40.9 
2004/05 6,423 882 3,393 (1,435) (73) 9,191 12,296 (2,035) 10,261 41.7 
2005/06 6,606 890 3,369 (1,515) (97) 9,252 12,061 (2,170) 9,891 43.1 
2006/07 7,466 837 3,517 (2,206) (95) 9,519 11,962 (2,188) 9,774 46.2 
2007/08 7,920 836 3,548 (2,309) (90) 9,905 11,953 (2,118) 9,835 48.9 
2008/09 8,055 879 3,616 (1,533) (93) 10,924 12,804 (2,063) 10,741 50.6 
2009/10 7,667 835 3,687 (1,823) (52) 10,314 12,033 (1,906) 10,127 51.4 
2010/11 7,566 840 3,684 (1,916) (43) 10,131 11,261 (1,923) 9,338 54.5 
2011/12 7,679 873 3,667 (1,961) (51) 10,207 10,826 (2,106) 8,720 57.3 
2012/13 8,266 926 4,026 (2,113) (48) 11,057 11,376 (2,146) 9,230 58.4 
2013/14 8,677 991 4,021 (1,994) (52) 11,643 11,643 (2,271) 9,372 60.1 
TOTAL 154,126 
Notes: RT = Railtrack; NR = Network Rail 
 Col 6 = Col 1 + Col 2 + Col 3 – Col 4 – Col 5  
 Col 7 = Col 6 up-rated to 2013/14 prices by RPI 
 Col 9  = Col 7 – Col 8.   
Sources: Cols 1-5 – Published accounts of the TOCs, FOCs and RT/NR; Col 8 – statistics of freight moved (ORR, 2015c) at deemed rate of 
£0.10 per tonne/km (see Figure 3); Col 10 – ORR, 2015c.   
 
4.3 The counter-factual – privatisation never happened 
The ‘counter-factual’ here is an estimate of what operating costs would have been 
had privatisation not taken place.  Figure 5 shows British Rail’s unit passenger 
operating costs alongside traffic volume (passenger/kms) from 1980/81 to 1993/94.  
As would be expected, unit costs tend to fall when traffic volumes rise and vice 
versa, but over the whole period, unit costs fall from 21.4ppp km (pence per 
passenger/km) in 1980/81 to 17ppp/km in 1993/94.  Thus, although traffic is virtually 
identical in those two years (about 30bn passenger/kms), unit costs fell by 1.8% pa 
over that period. 
It is of course impossible to be certain how British Rail would have performed after 
the mid-1990s had privatisation not taken place. Given its record in the 1980s, it 
would seem highly likely that with the great increase in traffic experienced after the 
mid-1990s, unit costs would have fallen even more rapidly, although actual figures 
can only be a matter of conjecture.  
Table 3 shows actual costs from Table 2 together with projected costs assuming a 
similar level of reduction (2% pa), a slower level of reduction (1% pa), and constant 
real unit costs at 1993/94 levels.   
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Table 3 – Projected passenger rail costs of a continuing British Rail (1993/94 to 
2013/14) 
Year Traffic British Rail costs (£m at 2013/14 
prices) assuming unit costs 
Actual 
(£m at 
2013/14 
prices) 
 
pass/kms 
(bns) 
decrease 
by 2% pa 
decrease 
by 1% pa 
are stable at 
93/94 level 
 
      
1993/94 30.4 5,168 5,168 5,168  
1994/95 28.7 4,781 4,830 4,879  
1995/96 30.0 4,898 4,999 5,100  
1996/97 32.1 5,136 5,295 5,457  
      
1997/98 34.7 5,441 5,667 5,899 6,797 
1998/99 36.3 5,578 5,869 6,171 6,520 
1999/00 38.5 5,798 6,162 6,545 6,553 
2000/01 38.2 5,638 6,053 6,494 6,818 
2001/02 39.1 5,655 6,133 6,647 10,138 
2002/03 39.7 5,627 6,165 6,749 10,166 
2003/04 40.9 5,681 6,288 6,953 9,869 
2004/05 41.7 5,676 6,347 7,089 10,261 
2005/06 43.1 5,750 6,495 7,327 9,891 
2006/07 46.2 6,040 6,892 7,854 9,774 
2007/08 48.9 6,265 7,222 8,313 9,835 
2008/09 50.6 6,353 7,398 8,602 10,741 
2009/10 51.4 6,325 7,440 8,738 10,127 
2010/11 54.5 6,572 7,810 9,265 9,338 
2011/12 57.3 6,771 8,129 9,741 8,720 
2012/13 58.4 6,763 8,202 9,928 9,230 
2013/14 60.1 6,821 8,357 10,217 9,372 
  
Note: the ‘base case’ for the above is the estimate that British Rail’s unit operating costs in 
1993/94 were (£5,168m/30.4bn =) £0.17 per passenger/km at 2013/14 prices (see above). Traffic 
figures: ORR (2015c).  Actual costs from Table 2. 
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The figures in Table 3 suggest that the privatised industry is now outperforming the 
hypothetical nationalised one – but only after 2010/11, and only if it is assumed that 
British Rail would have made no improvement in efficiency after 1993/94.   
On each of the three scenarios posited in Table 3, the privatised industry has cost 
more, over the whole period from 1997/98 to 2013/14, as shown in Table 4.   
Table 4: Additional operating costs of the privatised industry for the period, 
1997/98 to 2013/14 inclusive (in 2013/14 prices) 
British Rail’s 
assumed  
real unit cost 
British Rail 
costs 
(97/98 to 13/14) 
Actual costs 
 
(97/98 to 13/14) 
Additional 
cumulative 
costs 
Additional 
annual 
costs 
 £m £m £m £m 
Reduces 2% pa 102,754 154,126 51,372 3,022 
Reduces 1% pa 116,629 154,126 37,497 2,206 
At 1993/94 levels 132,532 154,126 21,594 1,270 
Source: see Table 3. 
The above figures imply that one could only argue that privatisation reduced costs by 
assuming a serious deterioration in British Rail’s hypothetical performance, with real 
unit costs between 1997/98 and 2013/14 costs more than 16% higher than they had 
been in 1993/94.  
Also evident from Table 2 and Figure 4 is the sharp rise in operating costs in 
2001/02, an apparent consequence of the Hatfield derailment in October 2000, as 
Railtrack’s neglect of the infrastructure was rectified.  Industry costs peaked in 
2008/09 but then began to fall, largely due to cost reduction by NR (see Section 3.5 
above).  Ironically, from the figures calculated for this paper, industry operating costs 
bottomed out in 2011/12 – just when McNulty’s report was published.    
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
5.1 Overall rail passenger operating costs 1997/98 to 2013/14 
The railways have very high fixed costs and one might have expected that the 
expansion of passenger traffic from the mid-1990s would have resulted in reduced 
unit costs and possibly even a profitable industry without need of public subsidy. 
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But, as the literature critical of rail privatisation has highlighted, this has not 
happened: costs and subsidy have both increased.  Privatisation has inflated costs: 
more exactly, given the volume of passenger traffic, the privatised industry has 
incurred higher costs than would have been incurred by British Rail.   
However, whilst the critical literature reviewed in Section 3 has proffered a variety of 
estimates of, and explanations for cost inflation, it lacks a robust empirical case 
demonstrating the scale of the additional costs generated by privatisation. 
The purpose of this paper has been to test and quantify this assertion, on a tolerably 
reliable basis, for the period from 1997/98 to 2013/14 by: (i) establishing actual costs 
of the industry using data from published financial statements and, (ii) estimating 
what the costs of British Rail would have been had privatisation not taken place, by 
making plausible assumptions about unit costs in that ‘counter-factual’ scenario.   
In his report McNulty (2011, p. 43) comments that: 
[M]aking any such estimate of savings inevitably requires significant simplification and 
judgement. The results should therefore be interpreted only as broadly indicative of the 
financial value that could be released through the implementation of the Study’s 
proposals. 
Similar caveats apply with the present work, particularly given the access and 
restrictions to some information from industry bodies (such as the ORR), but the 
authors similarly argue that their results are ‘broadly indicative’ of the additional costs 
imposed by privatisation. 
The present work suggests that these costs have been enormous.  The problems 
revealed by the Hatfield crash drove costs, already higher than those of British Rail, 
to extraordinary levels.  The quasi-nationalised NR, despite its flawed structure, has 
managed to bring infrastructure costs under control, but real unit costs have only 
fallen below pre-privatisation levels from 2011/12 onwards.   
British Rail actually achieved a reduction in real unit costs of 1.8% pa in its last 14 
years although traffic was virtually unchanged.  Given the very high fixed costs of the 
railways and the growth in passenger traffic after the mid-1990s, it would be 
plausible to argue that an even more rapid reduction in unit costs would have 
achieved, and that even the most favourable (to British Rail) assumption of a 2% pa 
reduction in Table 3 is somewhat conservative.  On this assumption, the additional 
aggregate costs of privatisation amount to more than £50bn (at 2013/14 prices) over 
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the period from 1997/98 to 2013/14.  Even if one assumed British Rail to have made 
no efficiency gains at all i.e. its unit costs in 2013/14 are the same as in 1993/94, the 
additional aggregate costs are more than £20bn.  One has to posit a serious 
deterioration in British Rail’s efficiency in order to eliminate its relative cost 
advantage over that 17-year period.  
5.2 Finance costs  
The figures estimated above refer only to operating costs. Yet as Table 5 shows, the 
debt and finance costs of NR alone dwarf those of British Rail, and the former’s 
interest of £1.53bn in 2013/14 is equivalent to 16% of total industry operating costs.   
Table 5 Debt and Interest of British Rail and Network Rail 
 British Rail in 1993/94 NR in 2013/14 
 Nominal At 2013/14 
prices 
 
 £m £m £m 
Debt at year end 2,484 4,388 32,987 
Interest charges 121 215 1,530 
 
Sources: Crompton and Jupe, 2003, p. 401; British Rail, 1994, NR, 2014, pp. 115, 125. 
 
From 1 September 2014, NR was re-classified by the Office of National Statistics as 
a Central Government body in the UK National Accounts (Joloza, 2013) and its debt 
now appears ‘on the government’s balance sheet’ (Hansard, 2013).  From 4 July 
2014, new debt, or the refinancing of existing debt, is arranged through the DfT, but 
NR is still paying a premium over government rates on pre-existing debt.  Moreover, 
Stephen Glaister, Chair of the ORR, has recently (June 2016) admitted that NR’s 
debt19, now around £40bn, is ‘never going to be repaid’, so whilst it has historically 
been described as ‘financing’ it is, in fact, ‘funding’ (Modern Railways, 2016, p. 6).  In 
other words, much of it will be written off in NR’s books and assumed by the state – it 
is effectively subsidy and, in practice, NR’s costs are correspondingly higher than in 
the above analysis.   
 
                                            
19
 In the ORR blog, Glaister confirms that ‘sooner or later, most of that debt will only ever be repaid out of taxation’ adding that 
‘there is a great deal of public money at stake –some £100bn, if all the projects in plan or under way over the next twenty years 
are accounted for’ (ORR, 2016).   
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5.3 Cost Structure  
As noted above, this paper’s estimates of the extent to which privatisation has 
increased the overall costs of operating rail passenger services (although based on 
published accounting data and plausible, even conservative assumptions), can only 
be taken as ‘broadly indicative’.  By the same token, these projections do not explain 
why this might have happened.   
An attempt to provide an explanation might begin by looking into the composition of 
operating costs before and after privatisation, identifying which costs in particular 
have been driven up.  However, the restructuring of the industry at privatisation 
means that a comparison of cost categories between British Rail and its successor 
companies is far from straightforward and is not attempted in this paper.   
Nevertheless, the scale of the increase in costs, even on conservative assumptions, 
implies that it cannot be due to the need of all the actors in the value chain to 
generate a profit margin and to the ‘leakage’ of dividends and interest payments.  
Rather, in the opinion of the authors, the cause is more likely to be found in the 
perverse decision to dismantle an industry that was historically vertically integrated 
for very good reasons, and the dysfunctionality of the resulting structure.   
It is striking that NR has been criticised, e.g. by McNulty, for its lack of private sector 
incentives, i.e. the need to generate a return for shareholders, when the directors of 
its predecessor, Railtrack, were positively obsessed with the share price and 
dividend rates.  Indeed, daily updates on the share price were posted on signal box 
noticeboards, and even after the Hatfield crash, when Railtrack reported a loss of 
£314m, the directors approved a dividend of £138m to reassure investors (Wolmar, 
2005, p. 95; McCartney and Stittle, 2015, p. 116).  Apparently, the choice is between 
Railtrack’s ‘neglect’ of the infrastructure and NR’s ‘gold-plating’ of the same.   
The evidence and analysis presented in this paper strongly suggest that in cost 
terms alone, the dismantling of British Rail was ill-judged and has proved to be a 
major public policy error.  Although British Rail was performing very well when 
compared to its European counterparts, proponents of privatisation argued that the 
private sector would improve efficiency and provide ‘better value for money’ over the 
‘dead hand’ of the state.  But this was largely an illusion, and indeed now, in a 
farcical twist that nobody could have foreseen, many of the franchises are actually 
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run, not by private enterprise but by state-owned European rail operators – the very 
ones that British Rail was out-performing in the 1980s20.   
 
                                            
20
 As already noted, Shaoul (2006, p. 157) argues that dividends paid to private operators are extracted from the railways 
whereas interest payments made by British Rail to the government had been ‘recycled back to the Department of Transport as 
owner and were, in principle at least, available to be spent on further railway expenditure’.  Where the franchisee is a European 
state-owned railway, such as Deutsche Bahn, dividends are indeed available for reinvestment in the railways – just not in 
Britain (Schneibel, 2011).   
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Sources: British Rail Annual Reports 
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Figure 2: British Rail Operating Costs 1980/81 to 1993/94 (at 2013/14 prices)
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Sources: Freight operating costs and traffic statistics from British Rail Annual Reports 
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Figure 3: British Rail Unit Freight Operating Costs, 1980/81 to 1993/94
41 
 
Figure 4: Passenger Traffic Volume and Unit Operating Costs, 1997/98 to 2013/14 
 
Sources: Traffic volume per Fig. 1; Unit operating costs per Table 2 (cols 9-10) 
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Figure 5: Passenger Volume and Unit Costs of British Rail, 1980/81 to 1993/94 
 
Sources: Passenger Volume per Fig. 1; Operating Costs per British Rail Accounts 
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